The 'summer offensive' (Hamkari Baraye Kandahar) in Kandahar will be the test case for US involvement in Afghanistan, according to Karen De Young at the Washington Post.  She reports that administration officials say that the results will be the centerpiece of a report due out in December that determines future war plans, especially the justification for the draw-down in troop levels in July, 2011. 

  De Young makes the case, aided by quotes from administration officials and General Stanley McChrystal that success is difficult to define, but will largely be a matter of perception: how the Afghan people, Hamid Karzai, the American Public, and the Taliban perceive the results. 

  What's at stake?

  De Young argues that the entire counter-insurgency strategy of 'Clear, hold, and build' is on the line, as well as refurbishing a globally tarnished image of the US Military.

  Kandahar will be the showcase for civilian and military forces working together; there are high hopes for the most recent training of Afghan security forces and police. 

  Atmospherics on the ground will be monitored closely: How will civilians react to the offensive?  Will they turn away from the Taliban?  Will tribal leaders accept US goals and plans?

  Officials say that ten regional administrative offices will attempt to oust Taliban, work with local leaders to create some balance among them; and spend lots of money toward those ends.

Now here's where it gets very Orwellian: (as though it weren't enough already.)

  An extra 10,000 soldiers will go to Kandahar, and 80% of the USAID budget for this year will be spent.  Yet McChrystal doesn't want the offensive to be seen as one; instead he prefers to call it a military presence.  Secretary Clinton says that no tanks will be rolling in...With an eye toward limiting civilian casualties, the General doesn't want the project to project an image of violence. 

  Given that atmospherics will be the measure of success, Robert Haddick at Foreign Policy Magazine opines:

'When defining success, U.S. officials are in a logical trap; they must keep their definitions secret in order to prevent the Taliban from targeting the measurements. But without stating their goals in advance, they will have a difficult time convincing the various audiences that they are achieving them.'

And

Given that the administration is hiding the definition of success, Obama has repeated the July 2011 withdrawal pledge, and the U.S. 2012 electoral calendar will by then be in motion, couldn't the White House staff just write the December strategy review now?

The one factor that actually remains unknown is how the Taliban will respond to the Kandahar offensive. The low-risk option for the Taliban is simply to withdraw to their sanctuaries and wait for two years before returning to restore their position. They've done this before and will be in a position to do so again. Alternatively, some Taliban commanders may argue for greater resistance now in order to defend their prestige, which could be a valuable asset later.

Most likely, the picture this winter will be murky, with some signs of pacification mixed in with occasional Taliban raids and acts of terror, specifically designed for media coverage. But the December "atmospherics" forecast for Kandahar is already in -- and it reads "success!"

(bold text mine)

  In a related area, Jeremy Scahill writing for The Nation describes a multi-billion-dollar contract being let for the transport of over '500 loads' of military goods needing transport from Pakistan to Afghanistan.  Given the fiction that needs to be maintained both by the US and Pakistan that we aren't at war in Pakistan, cover for the project demands that local companies get the contracts.  Scahill talks about two major firms bidding who have Blackwater and other US connections.  More local jobs bills for these two nations, while our real employment hovers around 20%. 

  It would be logical to assume that many of our stated 'enemies' will receive some of these billions, much like the US paying the Taliban and drug lords to guard our convoys, which report by Scahill I spoofed about in this Nov. 2009 blog.

  De Young lists the potential downsides of the offensive, but this stands out:

'Among the "significant risks" the strategy poses, the analysis said, huge U.S. expenditures in Kandahar -- including 80 percent of U.S. Agency for International Development resources designated for Afghanistan this year -- could "undermine, rather than create, stability." Citing the "unsettling" results of research being conducted at Tufts University, it noted that little link has been established between aid and stability, and that most Afghans think more aid would simply contribute to the corruption seen as the primary fuel for insurgency.'

The strategy envisions quickly "wrap[ping] Kandahar City in a circle of assistance and development projects," some of them up and running by June 1, "followed by an influx of new projects in the city itself," the analysis said. But, it said, "There is a risk that ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] will exacerbate the popular perception that powerbrokers are the only real beneficiaries."

  You may be banging your heads against the nearest walls by now; but cut it out.  IMHO we need to hope that success will be declared by the administration, and troop draw-downs will commence next summer.  It seems unlikey that the Congresspeople who are moving to cut off more funds for the wars will be (ahem) successful; the trillion-dollar costs for these wars having been reached won't move many to oppose more being spent, nor profits made on them.  IMHO.

Question: No one seems to talk about the plans for the Trans-Afghan Pipeline factor into all this any longer.  What do  you think?