Michael Maiello's picture

    How Foreign Policy People Think, Part II

    Oh, wow.  Anne Marie-Slaughter has resurfaced in The New York Times to upbraid Obama for not having acted to stop the formation of ISIS in Syria two years ago. She begins:

    "For the last two years, many people in the foreign policy community, myself included, have argued repeatedly for the use of force in Syria — to no avail. We have been pilloried as warmongers and targeted, by none other than President Obama, as people who do not understand that force is not the solution to every question."

    That is frankly, stunning to me.  In 2002/2003, Slaughter advocated for the invasion of Iraq and got her way.  Despite her catastrophic blunder, she found a high level job in Hilary Clinton's State Department, giving her the ear of both the Secretary of State and the President.  If Clinton is elected President, she will probably be offered another high level job. If that's "pilloried," then sign me up.

    "This is where the White House is most blind. It sees the world on two planes: the humanitarian world of individual suffering, where no matter how heart-rending the pictures and how horrific the crimes, American vital interests are not engaged because it is just people; and the strategic world of government interests, where what matters is the chess game of one leader against another, and stopping both state and nonstate actors who are able to harm the United States.

    In fact, the two planes are inextricably linked. When a government begins to massacre its own citizens, with chemical weapons, barrel bombs and starvation, as Syria’s continues to do, it must be stopped. If it is not stopped, violence, displacement and fanaticism will flourish.”

    This is the thinking behind "Responsibility To Protect," a controversial foreign policy doctrine that Slaughter adheres to and promotes.  It has origins in the U.S. "failure" to act in Rwanda.  It is a far more mainstream idea in "The Foreign Policy Community" than it is in mainstream America.  That doesn't mean its wrong.  The purpose of these posts is to point out that these people, who make life and death decisions on our behalf, speak their own language and we are not always privy.

    "The answer to those questions may well involve the use of force on a limited but immediate basis, in both countries. Enough force to remind all parties that we can, from the air, see and retaliate against not only Al Qaeda members, whom our drones track for months, but also any individuals guilty of mass atrocities and crimes against humanity. Enough force to compel governments and rebels alike to the negotiating table. And enough force to create a breathing space in which decent leaders can begin to consolidate power."

    I'm sure its no surprise to any of you that the "Foreign Policy Community" is developing a language of war without risk.  Boots on the ground have been replaced with lightning bolts from the blue.  Don't worry, you will never have to fight and die for this and if your kids or your neighbors kids, who are volunteers, do have to fight, they probably won't have to die because drones.

    "On the legal side, we should act in both countries because we face a threat to global peace and security, precisely the situation the United Nations Security Council was established to address. If nations like Russia and China block action for their own narrow interests, we should act multilaterally, as we did in Kosovo, and then seek the Council’s approval after the fact. The United Nations Charter was created for peace among the people of the world, not as an instrument of state power."

    So if the UN Security Council doesn't go along it should be bypassed and given the chance to rubber stamp history after the fact because it is not an instrument of state power, you see.  I guess she's right.  It's not an instrument.  Unless an unlocked door is an instrument.

    Here I see something about power and its unilateral exercise that holds hands with what we learned from Robert Kagan yesterday.

     

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    Comments

    The major flaw in this thinking as I see it is caught in this sentence:

    And enough force to create a breathing space in which decent leaders can begin to consolidate power.

    The problem is that whoever comes in to replace the replace power is not necessarily decent, or if they were at the beginning, soon discover that (near) absolute power corrupts (nearly) absolutely.

    I was just listening to an interview on NPR with the author James Copnall about his book A Poisonous Thorn in Our Hearts: Sudan and South Sudan's Bitter and Incomplete Divorce. There was definitely good reasons to break up Sudan, its civil war bringing death, suffering, and chaos.  One point Copnall makes is that what makes a good rebel leader doesn't necessarily make for a good leader of a new state. Corruption, human rights abuses, etc. plague Southern Sudan: as one threat is removed, new squabbles and fights are found.

    So we give the breathing face with the drone attacks, which would inevitably have some civilian casualties, further creating anti-US sentiment, only to find that what replaces the terror of the current regime is a new terror.  The ghost of Maximilien Robespierre and the Reign of Terror lives on.

     


    Very well put. Part of determining whether we have a "Responsibility to Protect" is determining whether we have an "Ability to Protect", and part of that is determining what is the best course of action, or barring that, what is just a good course of action. So often, we don't even have a clue as to knowing what the effects of our actions will be that it's hard to determine a priori what a good course of action is. Before even considering an action, we should be reasonably sure that the action will actually make things better, taking into accounts such factors as to whether the action will succeed, and if it does succeed, what will be the consequences of that action, including blowback.


      Her name "Slaughter" is appropriate, I think.  Her reference to Syria is screwed up, because Obama was NOT proposing to stop Assad from massacring his people. His plan was only to stop Assad from using chemical weapons, which did not save any lives. They simply continued the killing with conventional weapons. And we don't know for sure if Assad even used chemical weapons.

     It bugs me that people are still citing the Kosovo War as a model; I think it was a disaster.


    It also bugs me that they still cite Rwanda as the reason we absolutely must act with force all of the time.  By not acting in Rwanda we, what exactly?  It's not like we've since been attacked by angry Rwandans.  We certainly avoided getting ourselves embroiled in a war in what is definitely a rough neighborhood.  We do not owe China another trillion dollars to pay for invading Rwanda.  While we did not stop an atrocity there, we also avoided much catastrophe.


    By not acting in Rwanda we, what exactly?

    The other side of the coin is, what would've happened had we acted in Rwanda? How do we know it would've been better? As you allude to, it definitely could've been worse for our own personal interests had we made enemies of angry Rwandans. It possibly could've even been worse for Rwandans.


    By not acting in Rwanda we, what exactly?

    Permitted the slaughter of a million people.  Never mind, it's a "rough neighborhood", and why should we care what happens to them?  Saved ourselves some money, too.


    I think your notion is built on the idea that intervening in the short-term to prevent slaughter would result in no slaughter in the long-term.  Eventually the US (and other states, assuming we could get some help from other countries) would have to leave.  Look at what is happening in Iraq today.  Is intervention in a situation where there is so much hatred within the boundaries of a sovereign country such that people are willing to hack up another human with a machete something that can dealt with by putting boots on the ground, or is just a question of postponing things so that we can walk away and say "well, we tried."


      There hasn't been another genocide in Rwanda, so I don't think we can say "if we stopped it, it just would have started again when we left".


    I'm not saying another genocide would have happened, only that one cannot say had we stopped the first one we can conclude that one would not have happened later.


       We can say that one would not have happened up for at least twenty years, because that it is how long it has been since the genocide.


    Maybe, just maybe, the reason that it has been twenty years is because the people who remained there witnessed the horrors of a genocide, regardless of where they stood on the issue at the time it happened.  Even those who participated in the genocide, once it was over, must have gone through some serious alteration in how they viewed the "others."

    If you were to say that non-Jewish Germans felt the same way about Jews and how they should be treated after learning the truth about that genocide that occurred in their country is beyond ridiculous.  

     


      Whatever the reasons why there hasn't been a second genocide, there hasn't been one, so we can't argue against intervention on the grounds that "it would have started up again" once the Americans left.


    The point is that at the same time one can't argue for intervention so that a genocide would be avoided, only that it would have lessened the carnage (by the time we got troops there on the ground, it would have been already well under way) at that particular point in time.

    And maybe that would be enough justification, even if one included that a result would have been some increased anti-Americanism in the region because of the American troop involvement, seen by some as an occupying force or an attempt to re-colonize the country or region.


       Did anybody deny that the slaughter had begun? Nobody was advocating an invasion of Rwanda before the genocide.


    I made that point as a clarification, not because someone was saying that hadn't begun. But I do think it is important to acknowledge the passions of hate that would compel genocide had been already instilled in people. I think it is not to far fetched to say that the way that US troops could have stopped the genocide already underway would have meant the US would have to kill some of the attackers.  Our mere presence, like the presence of the UN forces, would have not been enough.  No one knows what kind of ripple effect the Hutu blood on the hands of US troops would have not only within Rwanda, but beyond its borders.

    I am not arguing that the US (and other countries) should not have stepped in to stop the mass slaughter.  The point was such an intervention, while a solution to that particular horror, would not in and of itself have consequences that would lead to other (maybe lesser) horrors and suffering.   

     

     

     

     


    You can never know all the consequences of your actions.  But that doesn't absolve you from the duty to act.  The child whose life you save may grow up to be a serial rapist or a cannibal or even a Republican.  But you are still obliged to save his life, if you can.


    Of course one can speculate that it might have started up again after we left. Its possible to stir things up and destabilize a country so badly with a botched intervention that it might have been even worse after we left.


    But 'we' were involved in Rwanda, on the losing side. Supposedly because 'we' were not forceful enough.

    Susan Rice has been quite angsty about it in interviews which is primarily why I am glad she passed on the State Department after the Benghazi blowup and why I was and still am quite angsty myself that she is National Security Advisor. Overcompensation in foreign policy is extremely dangerous.

     


    I served with Anne-Marie Slaughter. I knew Anne-Marie Slaughter. Anne-Marie Slaughter was a friend of mine. And you, Sir, are no Anne-Marie Slaughter.


    I would distinguish between the "Responsibility to Protect" as a policy per se and the critical issues that the president now confronts in Iraq.  I do think it is important to consider what this or that expert endorsed in 2002  -- of course -- but I also think it's far more important to consider what responsibility, if any, we Americans have here and now and going forward to prevent sectarian slaughters on all sides and/or to respond to ISIS specifically and related groups more generally.

    It seems to me that there is something missing, something less than whole, if (if) we ignore the facts on the ground as they are, notwithstanding that most of us believe for obvious reasons that everything that is happening is directly related to our decision to send American boys and girls to fight and die in Iraq back in 2003.   Rightly or wrongly, America invaded Iraq, and rightly or wrongly the president kept his commitment to withdraw our troops in 2011.  But that begs the principal question here and now (I think) of whether, a la Colin Powell and Crate & Barrel or whatever, we have a duty, a responsibility (small r), in this particular situation to do something.

    The only other comment I have generally is that I believe we all tend to give lip service to the notion that we should learn from history, but my sense is that a great swath of us have determined that history with respect to Iraq -- and other current and perhaps future international crises -- begins and ends with Bush's historically contemptible decision to send our kids off to fight and die there.  I think that's a mistake; indeed I think history demonstrates that it is a mistake.


    Humane and moral as always, Bruce.

    Here's the thing, I can be persuaded that the United States has ethical obligations here, as well as practical interests, but what I am detecting in the language of those who write the influential literature on the topic is not that argument.

    Instead I see Kagan arguing a sort of global Will to Power as the essence of all things.

    I see Slaughter arguing that we can project that force with minimal effort, risk or exertion and so we should.

    Combined, those two views are troubling to me.


    Understood.  I think one enduring historical lesson from 2003, or enduring reminder to all of us, is that skepticism of the really, really smart folks is both necessary and healthy.


    There is a certain ambiguity in the word "directly" as you use it in this sentence:

    ...most of us believe for obvious reasons that everything that is happening is directly related to our decision to send American boys and girls to fight and die in Iraq back in 2003.

    Yes one can say that the way that things are exactly unfolding now in June 2014 can related back to that invasion. But as listen to the reports and analysis, what is more directly related to what is unfolding is Maliki's decision to put Sunnis on the periphery and remove them from positions of power, especially in the military.  Had Maliki sought a legacy of bridging the divide between Sunni and Shia, ISIS would probably not have had the success we are witnessing today.

    Oppression was replaced with oppression, and that is usually a recipe for disaster. Could have Bush invaded Iraq, and later Obama withdraw the troops and intervened in such a way that led to a greater reconciliation and trust between the two side (and lets not forget the Kurds).  We'll never know.


    Interesting point.  What you're focusing on is akin to the age-old dilemma of establishing "proximate cause" in common law tort cases, i.e. whose negligence caused the ladder to fall on the plaintiff's head?  As my 1st year torts prof used to suggest, the fault (the original sin) is to be found in the decision to lend money to Christopher Columbus so he could sail to these shores.

    I think that Bush's decision is the proper benchmark here.  As to al-Maliki, I think he has exacerbated tensions and may have influenced former Sunni Baathists to align themselves against the central government and with ISIS.  But then you really need to ponder whether, under the best of circumstances, could al-Maliki's cooperation with the Sunni leadership (or portions thereof) have made a difference in the short and/or long term?  I don't really see that, but that's ultimately a hunch.


    Or we could just blame it on Eve and leave it at that. :)


      People have been talking lately about Shiite persecution of Sunnis, but remember the vast numbers of Shiites that the Sunnis massacred, both before and after the invasion. The Shiites would have had to have been saints to deal generously with the Sunnis after all that.


    Or at least like Nelson Mandela


      I don't know how nice Mandela would have been if over a hundred thousand South African blacks had been massacred.


    Seeing how after the invasion there was a low level civil war I'd guess that then Shiites killed as many or more Sunnis, But excepting that, yes, your post is true in the aggregate. But the majority, likely the vast majority, of Sunnis never killed a single Shiite.  The Shiite led government faced a choice of how to deal with the fact that Hussein's mostly Sunni regime killed many Shiites, Kurds etc. They chose the one that led inexorably to civil war. It might have felt good for a while to take revenge but I wonder if they're happy about it now.

    An eye for an eye simply means that soon the whole world will be blind. Gandhi


    ... begins and ends with Bush's historically contemptible decision to send our kids off to fight and die there.

     

    Topic twister warning. This is a small irritant but I feel it every time.
    There is a common way of characterizing American soldiers which I object to. I argue with myself as I attempt to organize my thoughts and make them coherent but my objection is to referring to those soldiers as “kids” or as “boys and girls” even if their age and level of maturity justify the terms.
     We should not send children to war in the first place so to referr to those we do send as ‘children’ is wrong in several different ways unless the intent is in the context of saying that they shouldn’t have been put in the position that we adults did in fact put them. Even though so many are young and immature, "kids" or “boys and girls” is a description that is a misguided show of affection for those we send to destroy and kill. The usage has, I believe, subliminal reasons and implications that I will not now expand on even when used quite innocently as I believe as you have done here. I will say that back when yellow ribbon futures were spiking I had the living room equivalent of road rage when I saw Tommy Franks on TV beaming as he described the instruments of our shock and awe as “youngsters”.
    But I guess like da man said, ya just gotta support the kids and kids do the darndest things


    Its difficult and complex. I met a veteran of the first gulf war at a sundance in Oregon. Afterwards we traveled together for a few weeks as I slowly made my way south. I was giving him a ride to New Mexico. He talked of his life and experiences in Kuwait. He was dying of cancer, likely caused by exposure to toxic chemicals in Kuwait. On the one hand he was a kid who was duped into joining the army, used, abused and discarded by a system that failed him. On the other hand at some point we have to consider him an adult and responsible for the adult choices he made. And he was dying because of those choices. I couldn't completely absolve him of responsibility or at least being somewhat complicit, yet I also couldn't blame him for the choices he made that led to the doom he faced.


    I hear you and appreciate your point.  I guess I do it for emphasis more often than not and not because they are not grow ups  with guns. 


    Removing the blah-blah, this op-ed boils down to a simplistic argument:

    1. Brutal dictators breed violent fanatics
    2. Violent fanatics (read: Al Qaeda) threaten American security
    3. Ergo, defeating brutal dictators protects American security

    This is a heavy argument to rest on a dubious premise that Slaughter baldly asserts as if it were obvious to all: Brutal dictators breed violent fanatics. 

    Yet, religious fanatics did not flourish in Saddam Hussein's Iraq, Hafez al-Assad Syria's, or Hosni Mubarak's Egypt. The fanatics have thrived in lawless, unstable warzones--Afghanistan, Somalia, Pakistan's tribal belt, the Sahara desert, and now Syria and Iraq.

    If dictators breed fanatics, there is scant historical evidence for it, but there is a great deal of evidence supporting an alternative premise that doesn't fit Slaughter's argument so well: War breeds violent fanatics.


    My limited understanding has always thought it was the Saudi's allowing the US to use their country to go after Saddam in the first Gulf War that led to Osama to focus his sights on the US.


    Yeah, that's the other side-effect she ignores. American intervention may or may not breed fanatics, but it clearly stimulates fanatics' hostility against the US.


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