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In Greatest Court Drama in Decade, Intellectual Honesty Defeated Politics

Yesterday was a good day for the law, people without healthcare, liberalism, the Tea Party, and President Obama, in no particular order.  I was surprised to see the PPACA upheld.  After the length of the oral arguments devoted to the PPACA, I thought there was one chance in three or four that Justice Kennedy would cross over to affirm its constitutionality, and no real chance that Chief Justice Roberts would if he did not.  The other votes all seemed certain.  But a funny thing happened on the way to what seemed predestined -- the intellectual honesty of Chief Justice John Roberts.  With respect and admiration, Mr. Chief Justice, this blog's for you.

Yesterday's decision was one of the three most dramatic in the time I've been a lawyer.  In 1992, the popular wisdom was that the Supreme Court was poised to reverse Roe v. Wade, in light of decisions from prior terms steadily chipping away at the federal constitutional right to abortion.  But Justices Souter and O'Connor, both Republican appointees, peeled Justice Kennedy from what would have been a Chief Justice Rehnquist-led majority.  Kennedy intoned that "liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt," and a conservative counterthrust in the law was dissipated.  Though from 1986 to 1992 it was imperiled, no one now seriously questions Roe, even as recent polling suggests that public ardor for the right to choose may have faded a bit.

The next (and most) dramatic Supreme Court moment of our lives was Bush v. Gore, as the Supreme Court reversed the Florida Supreme Court, and stopped the counting of votes that transfixed a nation staring into glass-walled conference rooms filled with lawyers and hanging chads.  In that case, all nine Justices voted consistent with their perceived political affiliations:  Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy were a conservative Republican majority.  The two Clinton appointees, Justices Breyer and Ginsburg, dissented, joined by Justices Stevens and Souter, who would wait to retire so that Democrat Barack Obama could pick their successors.

The drama yesterday lay in the tension between our ideas of law and politics.  Would a partisan cross the red/blue line, as in Casey, and let the PPACA stand?  Would all nine Supremes vote with the party that appointed them, making the case a 5-4 striking down of the law?  Or would the case be, as some analysts suggested before oral argument, a 6-3 or 7-2 continuation of the Court's broad construction of the Commerce Clause, with Justice Kennedy joined by the Chief, and perhaps even Justice Scalia?  While analysts widely believed before argument that the constitutionality of the PPACA was not a close question (consider that Charles Fried, Reagan's Solicitor General, and archconservative DC Circuit judge Laurence Silberman, the main source for Scalia clerks, found it constitutional), by argument it appeared otherwise.  The Court's decision to set the matter for such lengthy argument and the skepticism of the Court's conservative wing at argument, seemed to reflect the party politics stakes, and suggested a chance to revisit the polarization of Bush v. Gore, the most nakedly "political" decision, whatever meaning you ascribe to that word, of our lifetimes.

Instead, thanks to the Chief, we would revisit the June 1992 shock that was Casey.  Professor Paul Campos wrote an excellent piece suggesting that the references in the Scalia-Thomas-Alito-Kennedy dissent to "the Dissent" of Justice Ginsburg are subtle digs meant to indicate that Chief Justice Roberts deserted what would have been a majority late in the consideration of this matter.  Linda Greenhouse in the New York Times, as savvy a court-watcher as we have, stated that a seemingly coordinated raft of conservatives suddenly opining around Memorial Day that Chief Justice Roberts was under pressure from liberals to uphold the Act implied to her at that time a leak or suspicion from inside the Court itself that the Chief might defect.

And so he did, in a fashion impressive to me on two levels.  First, Chief Justice Roberts was the only one of nine members of the Court to part from his political party's orthodoxy on the issues presented.  The Obama DOJ presented the PPACA as a valid exercise of the Commerce Power and alternatively as valid under the taxing power.  All four Democrats agreed with both premises, while the other four Republicans disagreed, in a sort of Bush v. Gore redux.  While I don't agree with his parsing of the Commerce Clause, and prefer Justice Ginsburg's reading of it, Chief Justice Roberts took the primary legislative achievement of a President from an opposing political party, one he had set for an inordinate amount of oral argument, in a seeming bid at legitimizing whatever outcome followed… and got something right on principle that was politically inexpedient.  Yes, as the DOJ maintained, the penalty collected by the IRS can be viewed as a tax.  This sounds pretty obvious when you think about it, and the dissent's rejoinders that it is not are fairly feeble privileging of labels over substance.  Commerce Clause aside, the Chief got that issue right, in my view.

A second laudable quality I see in the Chief's opinion is that he called a strike pitched by President Obama, Majority Leader Reid, and Speaker Pelosi.  Having famously argued for judicial modesty in deeming himself a mere umpire in his Senate confirmation hearing, Chief Justice Roberts then led the Court to revamp First Amendment law in Citizens United, and in doing so not only overruled recent precedent, but very notably reached issues not originally framed by the parties for decision -- the antithesis of the reductive metaphor of the umpire as reactive and objective.  But upholding the PPACA is absolutely an act of modesty.  I saw some whining about Roberts quoting some silly old cases about saving statutes when you can.  Silly old cases, as it turns out, from Justices Holmes and Story.  As it turns out, when suggesting that the Court has a "plain duty to adopt that" construction of a law that saves its constitutionality, that Holmes guy was onto something, as was that Story guy a century before him.  This is the lineage of Roberts, and yesterday it served him well.  He held his nose, repeating that the merits of the law aren't up to him (or by implication his robed conservative brethren), and deferred to policy choices made by elected officials.  He refrained from embracing the full-throated judicial activism decried by the conservative movement of the 1980s in which he grew up -- but which was recently embraced in philosophically empty, instrumentalist screeds by George Will and others, who see the Roberts Court as a path around democratic choices with which they disagree.  Roberts was intellectually consistent here, and that is the stuff of which judging is made.  While we have not seen this kind of surprise from John Roberts before, you have to recognize and honor it when you do.

Having said all that, law isn't lit-crit.  It's choices that make differences for people either way.  And right now, there will be more poor people covered under Medicaid expansion.  Those covered by their parents' insurance remain so.  Preexisting condition discrimination lost yesterday.  And the Overton window just moved, big time.  While most Democrats support the Act, and a nontrivial minority of liberals do not, the reality of the Act surviving creates not only the possibility of the Act's own improvement and revision, but also creates a culture in which we have finally committed to the broad-based availability of health care, sought by Harry Truman, Teddy Kennedy, Mike Dukakis, Bill and Hillary Clinton, and so many others.

That is the victory of liberalism here.  That broad-based health care is the win, not the how of the Act.  That is true progress.  And naysayers on both sides of the Act (baggers of Tea or fire) may be surprised to see that a Gallup snap poll suggests that Americans are 46/46 on whether the Supreme Court correctly decided the case.  That the country, which on balance was never in favor of this Act (its approve/disapprove parked around 39/51 or so), now views the decision legitimizing it as a true split suggests that we are moving past this debate:  Dems/Obama/blue people accept it as part of their policy set, and Reps/Tea Party/red people hate it.  The Overton window has moved.  We are now split on party affiliation, the HCR decision, and gay marriage.  Welcome to 2012, not the same as 1992 or 2002.

With that even split in our political culture, I say yesterday's big winners are both Barack Obama and the Tea Party.  Before seeing the Gallup snap poll, and seeing Obama's daily tracking numbers unaffected or up, I wondered if 2010 might break out again.  I think upon reflection it will not.  The President wins because he won -- his signature legislation stands.  But he also won because he caused this argument to occur before the election, anticipating a run against the spokesman least able to explain why Obamacare is wrong -- the proponent of RomneyCare.  Mitt Romney will explain why no one should re-elect a President whose signature legislative achievement is, um, pretty much the same as his signature legislative achievement.  This will be interesting to watch, and already is (as Rick Santorum trashed yesterday's opinion by trashing RomneyCare as a failure).

This underscores why the Tea Party won yesterday.  Many conservative pundits sought solace in the meme that Roberts' decision would inflame the right that turned out so well in 2010, and that is surely true.  The decision adroitly frames the PPACA as imposing taxes (which, in honesty, is a fair way to look at it), and that will fuel turnout and rhetoric on the right.  The angriest element of the right got angrier yesterday, not only from losing the case, but from the betrayal of one of their own, a movement conservative gifted to them by George W. Bush, who had authored Citizens United, scaled back affirmative action, and who was poised to deliver a blow to the legislation they most dearly hate.  The success of Obama is the success of the Tea Party, and with the overreach it brings (see DE, AK, CO, NV 2010 Senate elections; see also 2012 Presidential primaries), the success of the Tea Party will continue to be the success of Obama, the adult voice of reason running against anger and overreaction.  Look for a Republican House, a jump ball Senate, and the same voters sending President Obama back to check downballot excesses.

Chief Justice John Roberts remains a movement conservative who votes with Justice Alito 96% of the time.  But he is also a Chief Justice who honored his stated philosophy of judicial modesty, and his heritage of deference to elected officials making laws and courts saving them, back to Holmes and Story.  (There was the same type of honesty in Justices Breyer and Kagan voting that the Medicaid expansion was an unconstitutional commandeering of state resources, I should add.)  This vision of judging represents an attempt to adhere to a rule of law over a rule of politics.  In honoring that ideal yesterday, while arm-waving to the voters about their right to make choices (and by implication undo yesterday's ruling at the ballot), the Chief was true to principle.  If he wanted to avoid another Bush v. Gore, with nine obviously politically contingent votes, good for him.  He did.  The country needs more of that thinking, not less.  Yesterday's decision respects that the election of 2008 mattered, and that the election of 2012 will too.  In making that point to partisans of both sides, Chief Justice Roberts reaffirmed what democracy is, and reaffirmed all the messy possibilities in our politics for moving forward or back again.  It is, as he suggested, now up to us.

I was stunned. I had fully prepared myself for repeal of the mandate and possibly the entire bill, but while I was glued to Scotus blog and the ruling came down, there it was. Wow. Is Barack Obama the luckiest man on the face of the earth or what? I was actually glad it was Roberts and not Kennedy who defected, because I think it gave the ruling more weight, he is the Chief Justice and he isn't known for siding with the liberals. I am glad he found his way to do the right thing.  The Republicans kept saying they were going to make this bill the President's waterloo, guess what, it's theirs.  I think he proved he is not owned by anyone, and I do think it is something Republicans needed to find out.

I was glad you wrote this blog AMan. 

And one more thing, you know, folks call this President weak all the time, that he rolls over all the time, for someone supposedly that weak, he sure comes out on top an awful lot.

 

The Right talking point: "Call it anything you like, the sneaky President was going to raise your taxes. After he spent and wasted billions; then in order to hide his intentions to raise taxes, he called it a mandate. A rose is a rose, by any other name, Obama is a socialist" 

I too was shocked at this.  It took a while to digest, and the opinions are slow reading, though worthwhile.

I do agree that Roberts crossing legitimized the ruling more, even as it framed the conservative talking point of taxation.  But if statism can't defend taxation, it is dead anyway.  A welcome conversation, I think, and an honest one.

And that President guy, as you note, has been coming out on top, despite having recently addressed in court and public a lot of our hot-button issues.

Food for thought; I enjoyed reading your take on the matter,  great work A Man.

Glad you liked it, Resistance.

Great post, A-Man. Thanks.

Thanks, Doc.

You really are a scholar A-man, and I appreciate this blogpost.  As I've written elsewhere, I guess I'm more concerned about the potential long-term implications of diluting congressional power over the commerce clause.  How do you think we get around Roberts' newly created distinction between inactivity and activity in commerce.  It seems to be premised more on broccoli than precedent as I read his decisison.  And  I think the wrong 5-4 majority in future years can run with this and wreak havoc.  Penny for your thoughts.  Am I just being paranoid, or is everyone really out to get our saftey net????

 

The five votes for the new conservative view of the Commerce power would prevent large programmatic expansions of government power or regulation, but you're not likely often to challenge the outer bounds of that authority with this or other Congresses we are likely to have any time soon.

I do not think that view of the Commerce power will be deployed to find unconstitutional any long-existing social programs.  

Ross Douthat's column yesterday searches in vain for what these rear-guard victories of conservatism from Thursday's victory will be; I think he's right, in that column's title, that the liberals won.  The PPACA is a large expansion of state power.  Thursday was the second to last chance to put that genie in the bottle.  November is probably the last.

But I think the bigger question is still whether the Court goes 6-3 hard conservative or 5-4 liberal, as that will guide all manner of questions, Thursday aside.

Great writing, A-Man. Love the Tea/Obama analogy.

With Obama's bump in Gallup, 5 points! essentially before the SC decision, plus Dem. Congressional approval tagging along, I wonder if we will reach a point when the Tea Congress will be running away from Romney. Wishful thinking.

But I'm not happy with the response so far to Republicans' new assault on the tax issue. As always, Republicans have an absolutely focused and coherent attack and the Dems are scattered.

By the way I hearken back to your fine blog on the wisdom of O's decision to point the ACA decision to this session.

Hey Oxy.  We are now in the second of five days in Gallup's sample with the ruling baked into it, and Obama is still up 47-44, as he was earlier in the week.  While it's not a precise historical analogy, when you look at Presidential debates, it isn't who won, but how the media reports on the perception of who won that tends to amplify the result.  It's hard to have the media cycle be all down on you when your Administration won the decision it sought.  So I think the immediate politics of this are actually neutral -- everyone thought through this fight two years ago, and could already have bought a tricorner cap and a Don't Tread on Me flag or not as the case may be.  Neutral on this is a win for Obama, and is better than I would have expected, given this result.

Romney will be chasing after the Tea Congress.  It, and not he, leads the Republican Party, both intellectually and in practice, as those folks are closer to its increasingly populist base.  Thus, for example, he is pitching elements of Ryanism, such as turning Medicaid into a voucher program.  Like John McCain, Romney is seeking to lead a party that isn't searching for the sensible center in which he won many of his stripes.  But the Tea folks won't run away from him.  They will likely wish for a purer champion.

Thanks for remembering my point on the gambit of calling the question of the PPACA now.  It was a tactical choice, and it was at some levels counterintuitive, but is even more clearly today than it was then the right move.  If Obama now wins this election, the discussion will have to be about improving the PPACA, not whether it is the law.  Romney is going to have fun in the debates after he's taken three months of shots at this and gets questions about points where he inevitably will have been caught attacking his own record.  There will be glassy-eyed pauses, and robotic, unconvincing explanations.  I'll bet you $10,000 there will be.

I have been saying for two years, this is going to be the replay of the 2004 election.  

I wouldn't be too worried about messaging against this.  It's easy to be against when you're out of power.  Moreover, Democrats are usually worse at messaging, and also getting things passed.  This Presidential term, Dems got over the second hurdle.  Fixing the first deficiency should flow from curing the second.  

Thanks.

That is the victory of liberalism here.  That broad-based health care is the win, not the how of the Act.  That is true progress.

This is why I am so pleased with the decision.  Now Republicans and conservatives can't just talk about repealing Obamacare, they have to also give some clue as to how they will keep the parts of it people like.  The more people get a taste of something closer to universal health care, the less they will want to go back to the old days and the more open they will be to seeing it expanded. 

And that as you say is true progress.  It ain't glamorous revolution in the streets, but it is moving forward.

Oh, and overall, excellent job in providing a summary analysis of this significant event.

Taking collective responsibility for the provision of health care is a good first step.  Cost control is important to tackle next, as health care continues to eat a bigger and bigger chunk of our disposable income and GDP.

I think electing a President and a Congress that finally get the government involved in greatly broadening the provision of health care is pretty revolutionary.  I remember supporting Mike Dukakis in 1988, as he raised this issue and simply got clocked -- and that was a time when health care was much cheaper, and expanding coverage less daunting.  So this is a very different political gameset than the Reagan era.

Unless PPACA is repealed in the next year, I think the cost control debate will end up becoming a contest between single payer, modified single payer, and abandoning the breadth of coverage the PPACA stands for.  The cost spiral will not permit this debate to be kicked down the road for long.

Glad you liked it.  I had no time to write in the first 24 hours, and my thinking benefited from reading through that very dense and interesting news cycle.

 I had no time to write in the first 24 hours, and my thinking benefited from reading through that very dense and interesting news cycle.

I didn't pour over every word written or listen to every pundit prior to the decision, but it seemed to me not only the decision, but the "who" of the decision was not something anyone really saw coming - not to mention Roberts take on it.  I think everybody who was commenting in the first hours of the decision was just pulling stuff from their * if they weren't being purely ideological. 

As someone trained academically as a historian, waiting 24 hours before commenting on a decision of this magnitude seems the mature thing to do.

Good job A!

Thanks, Hal.

I was hoping you'd have some comments.  You didn't disappoint, and it's a wonderful read.  My thanks.

Thank you, Anna, it was fun to write and am glad you read it.

Enjoyed the analysis, A-man. I was shocked with the decision, but obviously pleased.

 

Thanks, stilli.  I didn't expect it either.  Wondering whether it will help Republicans more in purple/red areas.  Thinking MT, ND Sen, for example.

The principle Roberts relied on is that in passing judgment on the constitutionality of a law “every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.” The law should be interpreted in a constitutional manner so long as and it is “fairly possible” to interpret in such a way.  Now as I understand the principles involved here, the idea is that whenever there are several readings available for an ambiguously worded law, the court should opt for a constitutional reading over an unconstitutional reading, so long as the constitutional reading is a sensible or “fairly possible” interpretation.  The principle does not enjoin or permit supplying the law with a constitutional reconstruction that is in conflict with the plain meaning of the legislative language.

For example, if Congress had written a law that said, “Every adult is required to join a church and pay a tithe, and shall pay a $10,000 fine for failing to do so,” the court cannot say “the law is constitutional so long as we read “required” as “suggested”, and read “fine” as “tax” – so we will read it that way.”

The PPACA uses the term “mandate” frequently, and calls the shared responsibility payment a “penalty”.  Roberts says, “The most straightforward reading of the mandate is that it commands individuals to purchase insurance.”  Indeed it is.  Roberts himself, in the body of his decision, uses “penalty” and “mandate” to describe the relevant provisions of the law, and says that the mandate “requires individuals to purchase a health insurance policy providing a mini­mum level of coverage.”

But Roberts argues at length that Congress does not have the power to require individuals to purchase health insurance.  So he then goes on to endorse a radical functionalism according to which the court can disregard the legislature’s manifest intent as expressed in the plain language of the statute in order to reconstruct the statute in a way that turns it into something constitutional.

This doesn’t really look like intellectual integrity or honesty for me.  Instead, it looks like Roberts made a pragmatic political decision to find some method for upholding the law so as to prevent his court from being branded as radical and activist opponents of social legislation, which would give political ammunition to liberals.  He’s hoping to get Romney elected so they can pack the court with more Federalist Society types.  So he reached for some spurious reasoning in order to play the long-term political game.

Roberts gave the health care industry the mandate that it wanted while trying to limit the future reach of the Commerce clause in the same breath. If the Roberts court had ruled against Citizens United then ruled against ACA, I could believe that Roberts was intellectually honest — but not the other way around.

Dan, thank you for commenting.  I disagree with the entirety of your comment for several reasons.

First, you seem to see some contradiction between saying that the mandate does not fit within the Commerce Clause and saying that it is authorized by the taxing power.  There is no contradiction in that; they are separate provisions of the Constitution that must be applied and analyzed separately.

Second, and this is where you're conflating things to find a false contradiction, he's not saying Congress doesn't have the power to make people buy health insurance as much as he's saying the Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clauses don't authorize it.  From there, he reads the "shall" of buying insurance in a way I think makes a lot of sense.  It is that people should buy insurance in general, and that those who are already doing so are in essence not affected by the mandate.  The only people affected by the mandate are those who do not already purchase it.  They too are not *made* to buy health insurance (as he says they cannot be), but they are taxed to pay for the social cost attendant to that decision, which is well-documented in Justice Ginsburg's decision.  This is a logical reading of it.

Third, statutory interpretation is a difficult animal.  It does not consist of divining the One True Intent of Congress.  Rather, it is a somewhat fictive exercise, in which you assume that the Congress meant to draft a constitutional statute, and look for second or third level meanings -- it's not what they "meant," it's whether you can read the statute that way.  This is neither the first nor the last time the Supreme Court will harrumph and find the primary meaning unsatisfying and adopt a saving construction.  You are in essence saying that only the primary attribute of the mandate -- that one must buy insurance -- can be used in interpreting the charge upon nonbuyers.  I think that's wrong because it ignores the tax-like aspects of the collection -- it is collected by the IRS and levied by the federal government to offset other expenses the feds are now picking up.  I'm sure CBO scored the bills as budget-balancing or busting by using these revenue inputs.  To say they are only only only penalties and not taxes is a weird literalism adopted by those in dissent with whom I'm sure you never and don't today agree.  There's also no reason to consider the charge upon the nonbuyers other than in isolation, since those already with insurance aren't subject to a further command to buy it.  As to the nonbuyers alone, it's a tax.

Fourth, the double-bank shot theory is never very satisfactory.  To me, your argument runs afoul of Occam's Razor all over the place.  For one thing, the opinion is simply consistent with Roberts' stated jurisprudential views.  For another, why wouldn't a more partisan or at least some other member of the Court rule as you suggest before Roberts?  If this outcome hands a campaign issue to the Tea Party, wouldn't Scalia or Alito realize that?  More to the point, if John Roberts is a political conservative who hates Obamacare like Tea Party people do, wouldn't it be simpler to not let the PPACA go forward rather than letting it go forward as a means of electing more people to stop it from going forward?  (Especially since Romney may lose the election anyway, in which case you get both Obamacare and more Obama; a more "political" decisionmaker would seem smarter to book a win now.)  There is a very strong cart-before-the-horse illogic to the decision-path you are imputing to him. Finally, the strong conservatives in dissent seem honked off at CJ Roberts.  That seems to support each of the points I've made in this paragraph, and that the orthodox "political" conservative justice would rationally knock down the PPACA.  The more nakedly political logic is Scalia's, as he had to really shift in his Commerce Clause views to get to the PPACA dissent.

Finally, there's no getting over that everyone else among the nine voted with their appointing party on the ultimate question of the case -- except CJ Roberts.  How the one guy who didn't do that is equally or more political is to me speculative and not logical.  One could more easily hypothecate, as commentators have, that CJ Roberts sided with the Administration to avoid himself or his Court being seen as nakedly political.  I suppose you could call that political too, except for the obviously contrary fact that he still mostly votes like Justice Alito.

Articleman, Roberts does not simply reject the contention that either the Commerce Clause or Necessary and Proper clause gives Congress the power to require people to buy health insurance, while holding that the taxing authority does give Congress that power.   He instead adopts a reading of the law according to which the law does not enact a legal requirement at all, a reading according to which it does not command an action.

He says that "the most straightforward reading of the mandate is that it commands individuals to purchase insurance." (p. 37)  In accordance with that reading, he goes on, one would read the intention of the act as making failure to buy health insurance "unlawful", and interpret the shared responsibility payment as a penalty for failing to obey the law.  What is a penalty?   He says that "in distinguishing penalties from taxes, this Court has explained that 'if the concept of penalty means anything, it means punishment for an unlawful act or omission.' "

But in his subsequent reasoning he adopts a construction of the law according to which it does not create a legal requirement to buy health insurance, and does not impose a penalty as punishment for failure to obey that legal requirement.  Roberts accepts that the purpose of the tax is to influence behavior in a certain way and motivate a certain kind of behavior, just as many taxes do, but accepts a reading of the law according to which the legislature is not attempting to bring about this behavior by enacting a legal requirement that people so behave.

Fair enough, if the law were ambiguous.  But the law itself frequently describes the payment as a "penalty", and describes the "shall" involved as a "mandate."  For a law-maker to mandate some action is, I would assume, universally recognized as the same thing as commanding or requiring it.  And the "penalty" language is straightforward: it's right there on the face of the law.

Roberts says it is legitimate jurisprudence here to disregard "the designation of the exaction", and view only its "substance and application.”.  The idea seems to be that if Congress enacts a law that says P, and the passage of the law has the functional effect of modifying behavior in some way so as to bring about A, and if a law that says Q would also bring about A, and if Congress has the power to pass a law that says Q but does not have the power to pass a law that says P, then the court is permitted to reconstruct the law as saying Q.

I think this is a dangerous precedent to set, since a lot of existing constitutional law, as I understand it, depends not just on the functional behavioral effect of enactments, but on the legislative intent of the enactment and the legitimacy of the principles endorsed and powers claimed by the enactment.

I'm not saying there is "one true meaning" for every legislative enactment.  They are almost always vague and ambiguous and subject to different readings.  But legitimate readings must fall within some boundaries permitted by the language used.  And if they conflict with the plain established meaning of commonplace terminology used routinely in crafting legislation, I don't think they are legitimate.  I don't see how you can look at a law in which seasoned legislators say "We are mandating X, and establishing Y as the penalty for  not doing X", and say, "Well, maybe "mandate" means "recommend" and "penalty" means "non-punitive exaction for people who happen not to have conformed with the recommendation."

I don't understand your "Fourth" and "Fifth" paragraph.  I think you are using narrow definitions of "political", "liberal" and "conservative".  I think Roberts is just smarter than the blowhard Scalia and hack Alito.  I believe he has a long term strategy of returning the country to a more federalist, small government system, and wants to dismantle the constitutional framework for social and economic activism in stages.  Executing that strategy means getting the right justices appointed over many years.  I suspect he understands that following Citizens United and the recent ideological outbursts of Scalia, the reputation of the Court for independence and judiciousness is now at risk, and that now is not the time to drop a bomb of judicial activism on a very major piece of Congressional legislation.  Doing so would have handed Obama another election issue of an out-of-control court of ideological conservative judicial activists that need to be reigned in.  Roberts wants to pick his battles more wisely.

Now, even if that is not true, and one views Roberts's action as wise or even statesmanlike, I don't think that is the same thing as saying it reflects "intellectual integrity".   It is instead a case of sacrificing intellectual integrity to the higher rule of political practicality and stability.

You are again making the double bank-shot argument, and again I find it unpersuasive.  You say that CJ Roberts wants to return us to a "small government system," and for that reason decided... to hold constitutional a massive expansion of government authority into the realm of health care, and functionally allow compulsion of all persons to buy health insurance.  This is the paradox and failing of that argument, which is much of the point of my paragraph "Fourth."  I simply do not think that a reasonable person in CJ Roberts' position either controls or thinks they can control the outcome of a Presidential election by how they choose to rule or chose to describe their ruling last Thursday.  So I don't think it's plausible that he's executing a strategy to pack the Court with fellow travelers.  Again, his fellow travelers are talking about impeaching him, are yelling at him in dissent.  Kind of a weird way to bring your agenda into effect.

I agree that Roberts didn't want to drop an activism bomb.  But that's likely at least partly a philosophical thing on his part.  Maybe he was stung by the extreme criticism of Citizens United, and cringed both at the President complaining of it in his SOTU, and Justice Alito rejoining from the well.  These things are all possible, interesting, and unknowable.

I am not saying it was "statesmanlike."  That is others deciding that judging is purely politics, and then assessing the judge's performance as politics, which says more about the person assessing it (far more) than about the judge being assessed.  At bottom, CJ Roberts is invoking a largely discredited ideal of judging as having separation from political determination.  He did this in a great deal of arm-waving about not approving the law in substance.  That is still a good message, and it is so conspicuously and heavy-handedly antipolitical, that calling it political based on conjecture about his motives seems specious to me; and conjecture resting on the premise that CJ Roberts can determine the election seems unsupportable to me because he cannot.

I do see the tension you note between saying there is no power to affirmatively make one buy insurance, while there is the power to tax the intentionally uninsured.  Yet there are those already buying insurance.  That Congress likes that behavior and cannot compel it under the Commerce Clause does not stop it from taxing the absence of its purchase.  Put another way, your focus on Congressional intent and language seems to allow that if Congress re-passed the PPACA with identical structural provisions but called the penalty a tax, and said "The intention of this subpart is to tax people who don't buy insurance, because Congress finds that behavior taxworthy", that would be ok and constitutional, but the way Congress wrote the penalty/tax into the PPACA is not ok and not constitutional.  That to me does not make any sense.  

Anyhow, back to your point:  yes, the tax of the absence of buying insurance can be called compulsion to buy insurance, as you argue.  But it is as reasonable to say that CJ Roberts really supports Justice Ginsburg's Commerce Clause holding (but wants it limited to these facts) as it is to say that his holding about taxation is unsupportable, as you do.  You clearly embrace the latter alternative because your comment is more result-oriented than his opinion, IMO.  You have decided that he is doing something malign or necessarily political, and are redescribing his arguments to that end.  By your reasoning, you could as easily conclude that his Commerce Clause holding was insincere, and that he's really empowering big government but a bit embarrassed to admit it.  Not sure why you don't come out there, instead of thinking the tax holding is false, contrived, and meant to injure his political opponents indirectly.  Again, Occam's Razor.  Conspiratorial imputations are usually too complex to be true.  No one really plays eleventy-dimensional chess that way.

I do see the tension you note between saying there is no power to affirmatively make one buy insurance, while there is the power to tax the intentionally uninsured.

That's not the tension I'm talking about.  I think Roberts is absolutely correct that even if Congress has no authority to make people do certain things, it still might have the power to tax you for failing to do those things, with the aim of encouraging you to do those things.  Even if Congress can't order you to buy vegetables, it can perhaps tax other foodstuffs so highly that most people will respond by buying more vegetables.

My argument is about this particular law, the PPACA.  Does that law direct or command people to buy health insurance; or does it just tax people who happen not to have not purchased health insurance?  And my claim is that reading it the latter way, given the plain language of the law, is so strained as to be somewhat ridiculous.  Is it really so unclear as to whether "mandate" means mandate, and "penalty" means penalty?

After first opining so derisively about the very idea of a law that compels people to buy vegetables, and fines them for failing to buy vegetables, Roberts's reasoning then seems to lead to the conclusion that if Congress did pass such a law, the court should then simply re-interpret the law as a tax on people who happen not to have bought vegetables.

I really wonder how far Roberts is willing to go with this, since it suggests a strategy for round-about criminalizing just about anything Congress wants to criminalize.  All they have to do is make the criminal penalty a monetary fine payable to the IRS.

 

I simply do not think that a reasonable person in CJ Roberts' position either controls or thinks they can control the outcome of a Presidential election by how they choose to rule or describe their ruling last Thursday.

I'm surprised you would think so.  For many disaffected progressives, the "no more Scalias and Alitos" argument is one of the few remaining reasons they have to care about the election.  If people think they have a more-or-less centrist Supreme Court disinclined to overturn Congressional enactments or repudiate existing precedent, then the Supreme Court is not much of a political issue.  But Roberts must know as well as anyone that if his court becomes branded as an activist, ideological court then the Supreme Court becomes a big political issue.

Dan, I think in your second paragraph you surrender the entire point we started with.  If you concede that Congress, even if barred from mandating purchase of insurance, can still tax people who don't as an encouragement to buy insurance, then you have conceded the reasonability and constitutionality of the PPACA by conceding the propriety of the only action to encourage such purchase.  How is the mandate independently nonviable once you concede the propriety of the penalty?

You have not said if you regard the Commerce Clause arguments of Justice Ginsburg as valid.  If you do, I would think you would like a decision that in practical effect carries them forward as did CJ Roberts' opinion by upholding a law with such a vast effect on commerce.

As to your last paragraph, several responses.  We are three days past the decision, and the Gallup sample is unchanged since before the decision, and consists 3/5 of post-decision sampling.  Rasmussen is unchanged and samples on a shorter roll, and its samples may postdate the decision entirely.  So empirically, this doesn't seem to be altering the election.  I think it's baked into the numbers both ways, and has been long since.

Further, there is a certain confirmation bias in your argument.  You're arguing that Roberts did what you think he did because he knows that the Supreme Court needs to be perceived as centrist to avoid being a good issue for the Democrats (never mind the positive vibe Obama got this week as a leader winning two major cases).  Yet the election is not likely to be decided by the small electoral wedge of disaffected progressives hesitating over rejecting Obama because of the prospect of liberals losing the Court conclusively.  Why?  (a) the percentage of such folks is very small in the total electorate and liberals mostly like Obama anyway; Obama has his highest approval ratings with self-described liberals, lower with Dem mods and cons, lowest with far more numerous independents; (b) Americans thought and are still more likely to think the Court is too liberal rather than too conservative.  It would be an illogical double-bank shot for CJ Roberts to be thinking about how to chill the ardor of a wedge of wavering firebaggers.  I think his concern that this Court not be viewed purely politically may be an end to him in and of itself.  It's simply too far-fetched to suggest that Roberts wanted to anger the people he likes to achieve some murky instrumental purpose.  And if he did, it's not working.

Dan, I think in your second paragraph you surrender the entire point we started with.  If you concede that Congress, even if barred from mandating purchase of insurance, can still tax people who don't as an encouragement to buy insurance, then you have conceded the reasonability and constitutionality of the PPACA by conceding the propriety of the only action to encourage such purchase.  How is the mandate independently nonviable once you concede the propriety of the penalty?

 

Articleman, I don't know why I'm having so much trouble getting this across.  The question for the court is not whether Congress has the constitutional authority to pass some law or other that taxes people who do not purchase health care.  It does, and so sayeth Roberts.  The question is whether the actual law before the court, the PPACA, can be fairly interpreted as a law of that kind.

Roberts argues that the AAPCA is not a law imposing a tax if it is instead a law imposing a legal requirement and a penalty for failing to fulfill that requirement.  Therefore, Roberts did not concede the propriety of the penalty.  A penalty, he says, is a type of punishment for unlawful behavior, and his argument explicitly rests on the claim that the shared responsibility payment is not a penalty.  That's why he discusses the principles for distinguishing taxes from penalties.  He seems to be taking it for granted in the third stage of his reasoning that the only arguments that support the claim that Congress has the power to require people to buy health insurance are the Commerce Clause argument and the Necessary and Proper argument, so that with those arguments disposed of, the government has no argument left for the claim that it has the power to require people to buy health insurance.

So, Roberts proceeds to examine whether there is some other way of defending the law that does not interpret it as imposing a legal requirement along with a penalty.  He concludes that the law is defensible if it is read as not imposing a penalty for unlawful behavior or failure to fulfill a legal requirement, but is instead viewed as a law that exacts a tax for a condition that is not legally required.

Now given those background premises and that dichotomy developed by Roberts, my claim is that, even if Congress does have the power to tax people who do not own health insurance, it is extremely implausible to read the law as imposing a tax instead of a penalty, since the law itself uses the term penalty several times to describe the shared responsibility payment.  And in the early part of his opinion, when he is not being so self-conscious, that's how Roberts describes it!

Again, the key points here are that Roberts is claiming the mandate is not a legal requirement and the payment is not a penalty.  He is not saying that the law is a tax which is not a kind of penalty.

It seems pretty clear to me that once you say there cannot be a constitutional mandate to buy health insurance, and you're left to consider the penalty in a disaggregated way, it's easy to see that it can be termed a tax.

You've said that you think that the decision is bad law, but would you have thought that if Justice Ginsburg's opinion was a five vote majority opinion joined by Roberts?  If not, then your beef is with the taxing power analysis of the penalty alone?  That's odd, because then you're interpretively with Scalia, Alito, Kennedy, and Thomas (who reject that analysis) and against Ginsburg, Kagan, Sotomayor, and Breyer (who embraced it).

I think at bottom your argument does amount to rejecting saving constructions.  I think the DOJ's argument on this point in the first place was abundantly sensible.  It's not like CJ Roberts pulled it out of the air.  The government argued it, and had case authority to do so.  The superficial label "penalty" does not control, that much is clear in the law before this decision.  Anyway, if you want to answer, feel free to have the last word, I think this is kind of run out at this point.  Thanks.

It's only a construction.

Congress has the right to tax.

Congress has no right to unreasonable seizures.

But then a tax on people who don't open their homes to search is not a "penalty", it's just a "tax", just like a fee for a gun permit isn't a penalty, it's a tax; a fee on people who don't want insurance is not a penalty, it's just a tax.

You may think the tax is too much in a particular case, but people are always complaining about taxes.

So if you want your First Amendment - put your money where your mouth is, a $1000 tax for each invocation.

Economists acknowledge that the economic effects of penalties vs. taxes vs. thumb screws often amount to the same thing in terms of effect & behavior, but I don't think they agree the measures are in practice substitutable.

This is seriously radical.

If a legislature writes a law that uses a neutral or ambiguous term like "payment" or "contribution", etc., and a question is raised as to whether that payment constitutes a tax, a penalty, a fine, or something else, then it would be permissible to place a saving construction on the text in resolving the indeterminate language.

But if the law explicitly describes the payment as a "penalty" several times, then I don't see how it is permissible to endorse an interpretation of the law that declares the payment not to be a penalty.  I also don't see how it falls within the bounds of reason to interpret a prescription described by the law itself as a "mandate" as not a legal requirement. That's what Roberts did, and it doesn't strike me as something that should be described as intellectually honest.  It's basically just a convenient lie about the plain meaning of the text of the law that gave Roberts a way of upholding this particular law while taking us back to the 19th century on the Commerce Clause.

The question isn't whether the Congress has the power to tax.  The question is whether this law is fairly interpreted as a tax.

Here's an analogy: Congress apparently has the power to require people to sign loyalty oaths of various kinds, under certain circumstances.  It does not have the power to force people to declare allegiance to God.  If Congress passes a law requiring certain people in government to sign a declaration of allegiance to God, would it be permissible for the court to say, "Well, we're upholding this law because, Congress does have the power to require loyalty oaths, and we think that what Congress is here describing as a declaration of allegiance to God can be fairly interpreted as a loyalty oath"?

I'm much more concerned about the Commerce Clause business.  As I suggested before, any body of law that permits a legislature to force you to send a dollar to the government so it can buy a banana and give it to you, but which denies the legislature the power to force you to buy the banana, seems inherently loony to me.

So empirically, this doesn't seem to be altering the election.  I think it's baked into the numbers both ways, and has been long since.

The question is what the impact would have been if the court had overturned the law.  I say it would have been dramatic.  Many ordinary, moderate people would have interpreted that result as a radical, politicized court declaring political war on the administration, and declaring war on tens of millions of people without health insurance.

When they preponderantly didn't favor the bill in the first place?  That's pretty counterintuitive.  And given the modest movement toward supporting the PPACA since the decision, you apparently think that either outcome would have helped Obama.

Yet the election is not likely to be decided by the small electoral wedge of disaffected progressives hesitating over rejecting Obama because of the prospect of liberals losing the Court conclusively.

The progressives were just an example of one group that cares about the Supreme Court.  The election is always fought over the hearts and minds of moderates.  Moderates tend to believe the Supreme Court should avoid injecting itself into political arguments.  Everyone, even people who did not like and support the PPACA, recognizes the zealous desire to overturn that law as a defining element of Tea Party politics, and moderates don't care for the Tea Party.  If the court had overturned the law, mainstream opinion would have been, "The court has gone Tea Party."  Obama would have had a gift-wrapped new argument: "Re-elect me so we can save the Supreme Court from subversion by radicals."

Nate Silver does not share your view that a loss on PPACA would have been a boon for Obama.

Yes, hard to say.  People don't like losers, so the effect of overturning the law might have been to brand Obama a loser.

Anyway, my main contention in both my original piece and the comments is that Robert's reasoning is not good, and the principles employed could have pernicious effects down the road..  So whether he did it out of long-term political calculations, or out of the desire to save the political integrity of his court by finding some non-partisan, independent middle ground, I don't think it was a great day for constitutional law.

A literal quibble:  saving the integrity of the Court is fundamentally antipolitical, as we have been discussing it, and cannot be fairly termed saving the political integrity of the court.  It's a conception that law extends in part past mechanical politics.  

It is likely that someday there will be a future expansion of the role of government is some area, and someone progressive will cite this decision as a marker for abstention from lightly trumping the expressed will of Congress.  In that sense, I think it is a jurisprudence that you may someday like more.

Well, what if a justice intentionally decides a case in a manner that lacks intellectual integrity and a truthful interpretation of the law in order to reach a result that will be perceived as independent and preserves the prestige of the court.  Is that a political act or anti-political act?

I think it is very badly wrong to suggest, as that self-contradicting bundle of premises does, that the DOJ arguments on the taxing power lack even plausibility or grounding in precedent.  It also takes five Justices, not one, to "decide" a case.  Your question to me is self-refuting, because a decision can't preserve institutional credibility unless it is well-grounded in precedent and joined by a group and is in a meaningful sense "right."  The premises that a holding can be "[un]truthful" but also perceived as independent externally and also well-grounded in precedent so as to be joined by five Justices seem to me incompatible, and did not occur here.

Since only 1 judge was a deciding vote - the others had made up their minds - and we mostly view the court in binary terms - for or against an issue - then yes, the decision of Roberts & why does set the appearance of court "precedence" and "credibility".

As a rhetorical example, if Rodney King were determined by a majority of jurors, hardly anyone would have cared whether the cops were convicted by 1 vote or unanimously - the riots wouldn't have happened and the jury would have been "non-racist".

You have more of a credibility/political contingency problem with the one judge who voted against party affiliation and agreed with one DOJ argument and one anti-PPACA argument than with the eight who voted straight up for their party and its two arguments?  Peculiar.

I mean perceived as independent by the general public - not court watchers.  The public doesn't know from precedent.  But they do know that a 5-4 party line vote of Republican appointees vs. Democratic appointees looks like a hack court.

I'm inclined to sympathize with Dan.

The Court (via Roberts) implying that we can now desist with criminal penalties, and simply ascribe "taxes" (formerly monetary penalties) leads us into new territory.

And we no longer need the overworked Commerce Clause - everything falls under Congress' right to tax.

So we won't prohibit abortion - we'll just tax it at $10K per.

We won't prohibit drugs - we'll just tax them at $100 per dose.

We won't require vaccinations - we'll just tax non-participation at $1000 per vaccine.

We won't ban soda - we'll just tax it at $5 a bottle.

It's all very Orwellian - there's no longer judicial involvement, as these are not criminal proceedings, just efficient commercial transactions and economic incentives. You don't need a lawyer, just H&R Block.

I'm waiting for those on private school vouchers, gun ownership, cable packages for "the digital divide" and life insurance.

 

Broccoli horrible, meet the soda horrible.

As a non-legal-minded person who goes on other clues and signifiers, I am of the mind to agree with your arguments and not with Dan's.

BUT, I must admit I am beginning to see a lot of writing on Dan's side of the scale that sounds quite reasonable and convincing, like this one:

In Obama’s Victory, a Loss for Congress, by James B. Stewart, New York Times, June 29, 2012

and I am now second-guessing my intuitions about Roberts from this ruling. I now think it's too soon to make assumptions based on what we know so far .

Just sayin' because it might be helpful for you if you want to tighten up your arguments further, i.e., perhaps there are other things in his ruling that suggest he may not be what we tend to think of him...

(BTW Dan: that article does much more than your arguments do for me, your reasoning and judgment seems very clearly wrapped up with your socialist dreams and not too objective to me. Not the least of which because you seem to start from a point where people shouldn't naturally dislike paying taxes to a faraway centralized government; I happen to think that's quite unrealistic, especially in a country founded the way this one was. But that's just one thing, there are many others in your argument that very much seem to reflect what I know from your writing is your own agenda.)

your reasoning and judgment seems very clearly wrapped up with your socialist dreams and not too objective to me.

I don't really see why AA.  In the things I have written on this case, there is almost nothing that takes any position at all on the best means of producing and delivering health care, or that dwells on those issues.  And very little in what I wrote has anything to do with whether this is a defeat or victory for liberalism or any other ideology.  I was focused in my own piece and in my comments an A-man's piece on Roberts's legal reasoning and principles.  I think just about anyone should be concerned about the kinds of interpretive principles and reasoning Roberts used in this case.  I think my position is still fairly captured by this line:

In his effort to strike a Solomonic balance and make the court look apolitical, he only succeeded in making it look absurd.

I don't buy the idea that because Roberts took a stance that was separate from the stance of the other Republican appointees and also from the stance of the Democratic appointees, that shows his intellectual integrity.  I think he was being political and too clever by half, but that his view of the political calculations might be different from the views of some of his colleagues.

But on the matter of health care politics itself, there is nothing in this opinion, as I see it, that poses any threat to the socialization of health care.  So no reason for me to object on that score.  I take it that the principle that the public can choose to buy stuff, and then deliver it equally among themselves as a public good is still intact and has not been threatened.  Taxing and spending are right where they always were.  Just as the public can collect a bunch of taxes in order to buy a bunch of munitions and hire a bunch of soldiers as a means of promoting the common defense, it can collect a bunch of taxes in order to buy health care goods and services to promote the general welfare.  In other words, it can do with health care what it already does with public education.  Nothing in this opinion suggests otherwise

It's only the neoliberal approach to social welfare issues, based on making use of private market competition and additional regulations that compel individuals to buy stuff in the private markets, that is in some jeopardy.   It looks like Roberts has told neoliberals that if they want to employ such measures, they should try to dress them up as taxes, subject to the laundry list of restrictions he gave that keep a tax from rising to the level of a legal mandate or requirement.

Of course, if we ever do decide to socialize health care, I'm sure the conservatives will find another battery of legal challenges to throw at the resulting law.  But that's a different fight.

The fact that CJ Roberts joined the liberals twice in one week is getting short shrift in the analysis of his motives.  This is tricky stuff.

Thank you for posting Stewart's article AA.  I really do believe that, in the long-term, Roberts' decision on the Commerce Clause is what is significant.  Call it political or not, I return to my original impression, that this short-term victory for the president and those of us who support him is a long-term loss for those of us who look to the federal government for social and economic change and the promotion of equal opportunity for all Americans.  

Jeffrey Toobin seems concerned about that as well.

http://www.newyorker.com/talk/comment/2012/07/09/120709taco_talk_toobin

Thanks for the link Dan; will have to read this later. 

Actually, I couldn't resist reading it, and it was much shorter than I expected!  I think Toobin is spot-on  and that's why I've been encouraging folks to read Justice Ginsburg's concurring opinion since the decision came out on Thursday.  As I wrote back then, this decision, to me, is an iron fist in a velvet glove.  And Toobin sums up my feelings to a tee:

It is also worth remembering that Roberts’s narrow conception of the Commerce Clause is now the law of the land. This new rule may limit the ability of Congress to expand the size of the government, and, indeed, may invite challenges to some government programs that are currently on the books, such as federal consumer safety or even seat-belt laws. In Ginsburg’s apt phrase, Roberts’s reading of the Commerce Clause is “stunningly retrogressive”—that is, a throwback to the pre-1937 state of the law. That may be Roberts’s goal. His doctrinal investments may take a while to pay off, but he has the luxury of guaranteed professional longevity. Roberts could still be Chief Justice when Obama is teaching the jump shot to Malia’s and Sasha’s children. By then, if Roberts has succeeded in limiting the scope of federal power, the health-care decision may look very different from how it looks today.

An interesting thing about Toobin's article is that the first and last paragraphs seem designed to put soft and flattering brackets around what is mainly a critical assessment.

I guess there is a feeling among liberals that they shouldn't look a gift horse in the mouth, and that we should now blow kisses at Roberts for having the decency not to overturn our health care reform law.

America’s Move to the Right

On the one hand, Roberts remained true to his philosophy of judicial restraint, stating in his decision: “every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.”  Furthermore, he steadfastly refused to join the Liberal wing in signing off on the bill’s constitutionality under the commerce clause; Congress, he maintained, most certainly cannot compel Americans to purchase health insurance.  In these respects, at least, wore Conservative garb.  However, Roberts did allow that in this case, the government's fine on individuals who buck the mandate, could be interpreted as a tax.  That was a particularly liberal reading of the bill, pun intended, given that for political reasons the ACA’s architects had been careful to not to call the penalty a tax.  But with that reading, Roberts found a way to join the four Liberal justices in upholding the ACA since Congress’ powers of taxation are well established.  Thus did Roberts craft an opinion that eased his Conservative conscience while also allowing a Liberal piece of legislation to stand.

Or did he?

Elsewhere, I have written about the larger political context of the Florida decision and the mirage of a Liberal victory it has created.  The deeper reality, it seems, has been lost amid the partisan fray.  But however much the press obscures it and however long Liberals stick their heads in the sand, the truth is unavoidable:

The ACA is not a Liberal piece of legislation.

Solid analysis, A-man, though I'm sympathetic to the logic of Dan's dissent. Here's another piece that argues Roberts is being philosophically consistent, but that puts a more personal spin on the origins of his position:

http://balkin.blogspot.it/2012/06/secret-history-of-chief-justices.html

Your mention of Roberts's definition of himself as an umpire reminded me of the long hockey tradition of counterbalancing penalties, especially after an obvious bad call. I can't help but think this is his subtle mea culpa for Citizens United. By my calculation, however, he still owes us a penalty shot.

Great catch! Brandeis to Friendly to Roberts, eh. (what the hell does eh mean eh?)

I'd never thought it through, but the closest Murrican equivalents are "ya know" and "dontcha think?" All ways to solicit the listener's agreement to what's been said so far. But a whole bunch of secondary meanings: "Say what?" "Sorry, I didn't quite get that," and the way you used it: "Interesting, I'll take that into consideration." A multipurpose word, I suspect derived from "aye." The French often stick "non?" at the end of their sentences instead. Contrary bastards, eh?

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